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Abstract	
	
Citizenship	 in	 the	UK	has	 in	 recent	 times	been	explicitly	 framed	as	a	privilege	not	a	 right,	
granted	 selectively	 and	 withdrawn	 from	 some.	 There	 are	 several	 criteria	 that	 assist	 the	
government	in	distinguishing	those	deserving	of	British	citizenship	from	those	undeserving,	
one	of	the	key	being	‘character’.	The	'bad	character'	criteria	can	apply	for	multiple	reasons	
from	inconsistencies	in	immigration	paperwork	to	direct	or	indirect	political	associations	with	
a	 range	 of	 disavowed	 political	 groups.	 Although	 not	 new,	 'bad	 character'	 has	 become	 a	
principle	reason	for	citizenship	refusals	in	recent	years,	though	has	received	little	academic	
scrutiny.	By	bringing	together	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	on	citizenship	refusals,	the	
paper	maps	 the	scale	of	 this	measure,	outlining	what	 it	means	and	 to	whom	 it	applies.	 It	
argues	that	the	'bad	character'	criteria	operates	as	a	racialised	exclusionary	mechanism	that	
constitutes	a	new	set	of	amorphous	restrictions	upon	the	lives	of	non-white	denizens.	
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Introduction	
	
‘Citizenship’,	the	Home	Office	has	repeatedly	stated	of	late,	‘is	a	privilege	not	a	right’	(Home	
Office	 2013).	 Though	 the	 sentiment	 is	 not	 new,	 its	 stark	 expression	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	
enhanced	 regulation	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 citizenship	 which	 operates	 to	 maintain	 its	
exclusivity	(De	Genova	2007).	The	policing	of	citizenship	attempts	to	distinguish	the	dutiful,	
deserving	from	the	disobedient,	transgressive,	undeserving;	the	former	qualities	attributed	
to	those	regarded	as	having	earned	the	right	to	citizenship,	the	latter	to	those	who	have	not	
(McGhee	2009).		To	achieve	and	sustain	this	hardened	threshold,	a	range	of	policies	and	legal	
measures	 have	 been	 introduced,	 or,	 if	 already	 in	 place,	 enhanced,	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 state	
retraction,	withdrawal	or	denial	of	citizenship	(Kapoor	and	Narkowicz	2017).		Such	measures	
include	citizenship	deprivation,	passport	removals	and	refusal	of	naturalisation.		The	effect	
of	 such	measures	 is	 to	starkly	 illuminate	 the	extension	of	 the	border	beyond	the	point	of	
immigration	so	that	marginal	subjects	who	possess	legal	citizenship	remain	vulnerable	and	in	
positions	of	precarity	through	maintained	raced	and	classed	structures	of	exclusion.		Across	
the	spectrum	of	this	immigration	and	citizenship	border	policing,	a	key	framing	criteria	that	
has	significantly	grown	in	emphasis	since	the	early	twenty-first	century	centres	around	the	
‘character’	 of	 a	 subject.	 	 A	 sufficiently	 amorphous	 value-laden	 measure,	 the	 notion	 of	
‘character’	has	been	overlaid	onto	 the	already	 institutionalised,	 complex	 interconnections	
between	 race	 and	 criminality,	 supplementing	 the	 check	 against	 criminal	 conduct	 with	 a	
broader	 assessment	 of	 civil	 and	 community	 behaviour	 and	 standing.	 	 Where	 the	 early	
makings	of	the	character	tests	were	alluded	to	in	the	securitisation	of	the	asylum	process,	
which	marked	a	broad	range	of	activity	as	constituting	‘particularly	serious	crime’	so	as	to	
disqualify	vast	numbers	of	asylum	applications	in	2004	(Joint	Committee	on	Human	Rights	
2004),	the	measure	has	further	advanced	and	encroached	into	other	parts	of	the	immigration	
system	 so	 that	 ‘non	 conducive,	 adverse	 character,	 conduct	 or	 associations’	 (Home	Office	
2017)	also	informs	decisions	on	applications	for	leave	to	remain	(permanent	settlement)	in	
the	UK.			
	
Most	starkly,	the	character	requirement	has	been	laid	out	rather	explicitly	in	the	criteria	for	
citizenship,	becoming	a	pivotal	condition	of	citizenship	acquisition.		Yet	unlike	other	threshold	
requirements	for	immigration	and	citizenship	such	as	residency,	tests	measuring	aptitude	in	
the	English	language	and	knowledge	of	life	in	the	UK	(Byrne	2017,	Osler	2009),	the	emphasis	
on	character	has	 received	 relatively	 little	attention,	a	 significant	oversight	because,	as	we	
illustrate	below,	 it	 represents	the	principle	reason	for	citizenship	refusal	over	the	 last	 few	
years.	In	this	paper	we	address	this	gap,	exploring	the	use	of	the	notion	of	‘bad	character’	as	
a	 border	 policing	 technique.	 	 We	 consider	 its	 application	 in	 immigration	 and	 citizenship	
regulation,	focusing	particularly	on	the	latter.	Through	a	multi-method	analysis	using	Home	
Office	 statistical	data,	 appeal	 judgements	 from	 the	High	Court	 (Administrative	Court)	 and	
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from	the	Special	Immigration	Appeal	Commission	(SIAC),	as	well	as	interview	data	gathered	
from	an	individual	who	have	been	refused	citizenship	on	these	grounds,	this	paper	argues	
that	the	measure	of	‘character’	operates	as	a	racialised	exclusionary	mechanism	that	works	
to	 supplement	 and	 legitimate	 race/class	 dynamics	 of	 immigration/citizenship	 exclusion.		
Framed	 in	terms	of	an	ever	expansive	notion	of	criminality,	 itself	a	process	that	mobilises	
racial	 ideologies	 and	 structures	 (Gilroy	 1987,	 Davis	 1997,	 Goldberg	 2002),	 governing	 by	
‘character’	furthers	the	project	of	biopolitical	disciplinary	paradigms	in	order	to	sustain	and	
enhance	systems	of	racial	exclusion.	
	
Framing	Character	
	
In	 2009	 the	 good	 character	 requirement	 for	 citizenship	 was	 revised	 as	 part	 of	 broader	
immigration-citizenship	reforms	brought	 in	under	Gordon	Brown	(Borders,	Citizenship	and	
Immigration	Act	2009),	all	part	of	the	state	response	to	the	enduring	crises	of	multiculturalism	
(Lentin	and	Titley	2011)	and	increasing	political	calls	for	integrationism	(Kundnani	2007).		The	
Brown	 Government’s	 ‘Path	 to	 Citizenship’,	 accordingly,	 strengthened	 a	 notion	 in	
development	for	some	time	that	citizenship	was	something	to	be	‘earned’	(Home	Office	2008,	
Blunkett	2002).		The	2009	enhancement	centred	around	a	staged	process	that	would	involve	
demonstration	of	contribution	 to	social	and	economic	 life	 in	a	number	of	ways	as	well	as	
proving	a	certain	degree	of	assimilation.	Sufficient	knowledge	of	life	in	the	UK	and	the	English	
language,	 requirements	 passed	 in	 2002	 (Byrne	 2017),	 would	 need	 to	 be	 demonstrated	
alongside	 exemplifying	 that	 one	 was	 of	 reputable	 ‘character’,	 a	 requirement	 that	
encompassed	multiple	considerations	including	previous	criminal	convictions	and	suspected	
criminality	but	 also	 civil	 society	 contributions	 such	as	paying	 taxes	and	 civic	 engagement.	
Though	the	character	requirements	have	long	been	part	of	legal	provisions	for	citizenship,	
policy	changes	brought	in	at	this	time	introduced	a	stricter	test,	adding	a	further	dimension	
to	a	shift	in	the	administration	of	citizenship	that	was	already	underway.		In	response	to	the	
concern	that	tests	and	prevailing	regulations	had	not	resulted	in	the	politically	desired	results	
of	 reducing	 citizenship	 applications,	 Damien	 Green	 MP	 noted	 during	 the	 Public	 Bill	
Committee	debate	that	‘this	part	of	the	Bill	[on	good	character]’	could	be	regarded	‘as	the	
Government	slightly	belatedly	addressing	the	fact	that	the	current	test	and	regulations	may	
not	have	fulfilled	all	the	criteria	that	the	Minister	would	want—or,	indeed,	that	many	others	
would	want’	(House	of	Commons	2009,	col.132).		
	
At	 the	 policy	 level,	 the	 attachment	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘good	 character’	 to	 immigration-
citizenship	regulations	has	been	threaded	through	Britain’s	racialized	history	of	immigration	
and	nationality	 legislation.	Alongside	the	 immigration	restrictions	of	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	
culminating	 in	 the	 1971	 Immigration	 Act	 which	 introduced	 the	 racially-coded	 concept	 of	
patriality	(Gilroy	1987,	Sivanandan	1981),	the	introduction	of	nationality	legislation	worked	
to	reinforce	racialised	distinctions	in	rights	and	belonging,	further	cementing	hierarchies	of	
citizenship	(Tyler	2013).		The	1981	Nationality	Act	removed	automatic	citizenships	rights	from	
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those	born	in	Britain,	specified	a	‘good	character’	requirement	for	citizenship,	and	opened	up	
space	for	future	governments	to	redefine	the	‘duties’	and	‘entitlements’	of	citizenship	as	they	
desired	 (CARF	 Collective	 1981).	 	 Critiqued	 as	 being	 immigration	 legislation	 in	 disguise	
(Sivanandan	1981),	the	1981	Nationality	Act	was	effective	because	it	essentially	extended	the	
limits	of	citizenship	acquisition	that	had	been	placed	on	postcolonials	wishing	to	enter	Britain	
to	those	who	were	already	resident.	The	good	character	requirement	was	institutionalised	
not	 only	 in	 immigration	 legislation	 but	 in	 nationality	 legislation,	 effectively	 extending	 the	
border	from	the	point	of	entry	and	admittance	into	the	nation-state	to	a	more	fluid	point	of	
inclusion/exclusion	encroaching	into	everyday	life	of	racially	marginalised	communities.			
	
As	a	measure,	‘good	character’	has	historically	been	conceived	of	in	terms	of	criminality	and	
its	 rising	 significance	 in	 relation	 to	 citizenship	 acquisition,	 refusal	 and	 withdrawal	 is	 an	
advancement	on	the	growing	emphasis	on	‘character’	in	asylum	and	immigration	policy	and	
legislation.	 Indeed,	as	a	way	of	policing	access	to	citizenship,	assessments	on	character	sit	
within	the	broader	set	of	policy	measures	that	have	gradually	retracted	rights	of	refugees	to	
settle	in	Britain	long	term	and	introduced	a	permanency	to	the	precarious	status	of	asylum	
seekers	(Espinoza	et	al	2017).		The	enhancement	of	asylum	and	immigration	restrictions	from	
the	 late	1990s,	 reinvigored	 through	 the	securitisation	of	 the	War	on	Terror,	has	 relied	on	
criminalisation	as	a	key	mechanism	for	justifying	exclusions	in	response	to	populist	demands	
for	 reducing	 and	 controlling	 both	 (De	 Genova	 2007,	 Fekete	 2009).	 	 The	 inclusion	 of	 a	
‘Specification	of	Particularly	Serious	Crimes	Order’	to	asylum	legislation	in	2004,	for	example,	
relied	on	a	generous	reading	of	established	qualifications	to	asylum	entitlement	relating	to	
danger	and	criminal	threat,	as	set	out	in	the	Refugee	Convention.	Article	33	of	the	Convention	
stipulated	that	states	must	not	return	a	refugee	to	‘the	frontiers	of	territories	where	his	life	
or	freedom	would	be	threatened	on	account	of	his	race,	religion,	nationality,	membership	of	
a	particular	social	group	or	political	opinion’	(UN	General	Assembly	1951:1),	except	for	when	
there	were	‘reasonable	grounds’	for	believing	such	a	person	to	be	‘a	danger	to	the	security	
to	the	country’,	or	who,	having	been	convicted	of	‘a	particularly	serious	crime’	constituted	‘a	
danger	 to	 the	 community’	 (UN	 General	 Assembly	 1951:2).	 In	 2004	 the	 UK	 Government	
specified	 that	 ‘serious	 crimes’	 included	 terrorism	 and	 related	 offences,	 but	 also	 ‘drug	
offences,	 immigration	offences,	 customs	and	excise	offences,	offences	against	 the	person	
including	a	wide	range	of	sexual	offences,	and	offences	against	property	such	as	theft	and	
criminal	damage’	(Joint	Committee	on	Human	Rights	2004,	p.7).	Similar	expansive	criteria	on	
criminality	 were	 incorporated	 into	 immigration	 legislation	 for	 deciding	 applications	 and	
subsequently	 came	 to	 inform	 policy	 specifying	 the	 requirements	 for	 indefinite	 leave	 to	
remain	and	citizenship	applications	 (Home	Office	2008,	2013,	2017).	 	The	commitment	 to	
renew	and	reinvigorate	the	character	requirement	 in	2009	drew	on	this	policy	 legacy	also	
placing	greater	emphasis	on	criminality	compared	with	its	invocation	in	previous	nationality	
legislation.	 Conviction	 ‘of	 any	 offence	 triable	 on	 indictment’	 could	 constitute	 grounds	 for	
citizenship	refusal	thus	enabling	greater	scope	for	border	control	agents	to	deny	asylum	on	
security	grounds.	
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Though	there	is	no	official	legal	definition	of	what	constitutes	‘bad	character’,	the	2013	Home	
Office	policy	guidance	indicated	that	it	incorporated	‘not	abiding	by	or	respecting	the	law’,	
being	‘associated	with	war	crimes’,	not	having	one’s	‘financial	affairs	in	appropriate	order’,	
being	 involved	 in	 ‘notorious	 activities’	 that	 ‘cast	 serious	 doubt	 on	 standing	 in	 the	 local	
community’,	being	dishonest	with	the	UK	Government,	or	having	previously	been	deprived	
of	citizenship	(Home	Office	2013).	Currently	behaviours	such	as	divorce,	promiscuity,	drinking	
or	gambling,	eccentricity	(including	beliefs),	and	unemployment	or	working	habits	should	not	
normally	 constitute	 grounds	 for	 refusal,	 but	 scale	 and	 persistence	 of	 such	 activities	 are	
considered	 potential	 grounds,	 particularly	 if	 it	 is	 a	 case	 likely	 to	 attract	 public	 or	 media	
attention.	 	Parenting,	debt,	bankruptcy	 factor	 too.	 	The	guidance	 further	 stipulates	 that	a	
decision	maker	can	still	refuse	citizenship	if	they	have	additional	doubts	outside	of	this	list	
and	there	is	some	flexibility	in	its	application	and	interpretation	(Home	Office	2013,	p.4).	In	
December	 2014	 the	 Home	 Office	 included	 additional	 criteria	 to	 the	 list	 of	 undesirable	
behaviours	 including	 illegal	 entry	 to	 the	 UK,	 assisting	 illegal	 migration,	 and	 a	 lack	 of	
compliancy	 with	 immigration	 regulations,	 including	 working	 without	 permission	 (Home	
Office	2014).	
	
The	Character	of	Citizenship	
	
In	her	exposition	of	the	politics	of	immigration	control,	Bridget	Anderson	(2013)	elucidates	
the	 dialectic	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 citizenship.	 A	 privileged	 status,	 citizenship	 is	
recurringly	framed	through	its	Others	whether	that	be	non-citizens,	those	marked	as	outside	
of	 the	 nation-state,	 or	 failed	 citizens,	 those	 with	 entitlement	 to	 legal	 citizenship	 but	
nevertheless	cast	as	non-belonging.	Such	a	thesis	follows	the	more	acute	critical	theory	claim	
that	it	is	in	relation	to	the	position	of	the	‘banned’,	as	Gorgio	Agamben	(1998)	has	termed	it,	
those	subjects	categorised	as	the	‘exception’	and	vulnerable	to	abandonment,	that	the	status	
of	 the	political-legal	 subject-citizen	 is	 continuously	 (re)defined	and	understood.	While	 the	
multiple	levels	at	which	citizenship	operates-	as	legal	status,	as	identity	marker	and	as	a	claim	
to	sovereignty-	tells	us	that	the	granting	of	formal	citizenship	is	not	necessarily	sufficient	for	
inclusion	 into	 the	 ‘community	 of	 value’	 (Anderson	 2013),	 the	 material	 freedoms	 and	
protections	that	are	attached	to	formal	legal	citizenship	and	the	claim-making	that	it	enables,	
even	 as	 they	 are	 continuously	 contested	 and	 scrutinised,	 arguably	 make	 access	 to	 this	
dimension	of	citizenship	most	critical	for	those	most	marginal.	
	
While	citizenship	is	framed	in	relation	to	several	identity	markers	and	discursive	regimes	that	
categorise	populations	and	determine	thresholds	of	inclusion	–	namely	race,	gender,	class-,	
at	 the	 structural	 level	 it	 is	 Britain’s	 colonial	 and	 imperial	 history,	 and	 so	 global	 racial	
formations,	 that	 have	 been	 central	 to	 shaping	 the	 design,	 form	 and	 nature	 of	 British	
citizenship	(Bhambra	2015,	Kapoor	2018).	It	is	out	from	this	genealogy	that	neo-colonial	and	
contemporary	imperialist	politics	have	played	a	critical	role	in	shaping	not	only	the	ideologies	
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attached	to	contemporary	citizenships,	but	the	governmentalities	for	policing	and	enforcing	
them	 (Kapoor	 2018).	 	 In	 the	 postcolonial	 period	 the	 racialized	 framing	 of	 citizenship	 has	
operated	at	two	levels:	on	the	first,	racial	ideas	of	nativism,	indigeneity	and	contamination	
continue	to	inform	the	conceptualisation	of	who	counts	as	‘citizen’	(Goldberg	2002);	and	then	
a	 second	 register	 emphasises	 citizenship	 to	 be	 contingent	 on	 the	 character,	 beliefs	 and	
behaviour	of	a	subject	(Medovoi	2012),	a	measure	racialized	both	in	terms	of	the	ontological	
assumptions	inscribed	within	it	and	through	its	associated	attachment	to	criminality.	It	is	the	
measure	of	‘character’	that	has	become	particularly	acute	in	the	context	of	the	War	on	Terror	
and	intensifying	Islamophobia,	perhaps	unsurprisingly	so	since	Islamophobia	 is	particularly	
concerned	with	socially	and	politically	constructing	race	through	cultural	markers	ascribed	in	
terms	of	ideological	difference	(Kundnani	2014).		
	
The	policing	of	character	as	it	is	invoked	here	resonates	with	a	deeper	historical	trajectory	
that	has	located	and	constructed	race	not	only	at	the	point	of	the	‘colour	line’	(Du	Bois	2004)	
in	a	way	that	relies	on	visual	racial	markers	to	culturally	determine	and	hierarchize	difference,	
but	at	the	level	of	a	supplementary	logic	that	emphasises	political-ideological	distinction	and	
threat,	 which	 then	 forms	 an	 additional	 discursive	 frame	with	 which	 to	 read	 and	 narrate	
already	racially	marked	bodies.	‘Dogma-line	racism’,	as	Leerom	Medovoi	(2012)	has	termed	
it,	periodically	recurring	in	different	historical	moments	and	prolifically	expressed	in	relation	
to	the	anti-Muslim	racism	of	late,	circulates	around	a	racialized	anxiety	about	the	presumed	
character	of	a	denizen	that	lurks	beneath	their	outward	presentation.	Any	attempt	to	suitably	
prove	‘conversion’,	here	in	the	form	of	accomplishing	set	thresholds	of	 ‘Britishness’	 in	the	
form	of	knowledge	and	English	language	tests	is	always	subject	to	some	uncertainty,	as	their	
soul/character	might	still	harbour	the	sin.		The	scrutiny	of	character	that	take	places	in	this	
citizenship	process	continuously	countenances	doubt	about	the	character	of	the	claimant	and	
thereupon	 continues	 to	 find	 ways	 in	 which	 to	 impugn	 the	 claimant	 through	 their	 past	
activities.		
	
The	deep	and	complex	interconnection	between	race	and	criminalisation,	long	noted,	plays	
a	critical	role	here.	In	discursive	terms,	crime,	as	Angela	Davis	(1997:266)	notes,	is	‘one	of	the	
masquerades	behind	which	‘race’,	with	all	its	menacing	ideological	complexity,	mobilizes	old	
public	fears	and	creates	new	ones’.	Ideological	tenets	of	racism	which	associate	various	forms	
of	criminality	with	differently	 racialised	categories	of	people-	asylum	seekers,	 immigrants,	
Muslims,	black	people	and	people	of	colour	–	are	fundamental	underpinnings	to	processes	of	
criminalisation.	 	 ‘Mugging’,	 ‘grooming’,	 ‘terrorism’	 and	 ‘gangs’	 are	 socially	 constructed	 in	
ways	such	that	they	become	synonymous	with	racialized	communities	and	cultures	(Hall	et	
al	 1978,	 Alexander	 2000,	 Cockbain	 2013,	 Kapoor	 2018).	 	 In	 conjunction,	 structural	
arrangements	are	put	in	place	that	have	the	impact	of	producing	the	material	conditions	for	
generating	suspects	and	culprits.	Racialised	subjects,	already	marginal	and	vulnerable,	who	
once	entangled	within	the	criminal	justice	system,	symbolically	work	to	reify	the	ideological	
notions	already	in	circulation	of	the	‘bogus’	or	‘drug-smuggling’	asylum	seeker,	the	‘illegal’	or	
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‘fraudulent’	 immigrant,	the	black	gang	member/drug	dealer,	the	Muslim	‘terrorist’.	 	 In	the	
context	 of	 policing	 citizenship,	 the	 policy	 specifications	 which	 expand	 the	 scope	 of	 what	
constitutes	bad	character	by	way	of	criminalised	behaviour,	thus,	in	many	ways	represent	the	
structural	accompaniment	to	the	broader	ideological	discourse	interconnecting	race	in	all	its	
floating	 signifying	 forms	 with	 criminalised	 representations	 (Hall	 et	 al	 1978,	 Gilroy	 1987,	
Goldberg	1993).			
	
While	 the	 framework	 for	 demarcating	 citizens	 and	 granting	 citizenship	 has	 always	 been	
deeply	 racialized,	 the	 supplementation	 of	 ‘objective’	 thresholds	 for	 citizenship	 such	 as	
residency	 requirements	with	 such	 ‘subjective’	 criteria	 significantly	 expands	 the	 scope	 for	
racial	 sorting,	 normalising	 an	 imperialist	 system	of	 citizenship.	 Analysis	 of	 the	 process	 by	
which	‘good	character’	is	enforced,	policed	and	disciplined	offers	a	novel	way	to	think	through	
the	articulation	and	expression	of	racial	governmentality	in	the	contemporary	moment	for	
enhancing	and	sustaining	borders	and	systems	of	exclusion.	
	
	
Methods	
The	 research	 presented	 in	 this	 article	 comes	 from	 a	 larger	 study	which	 has	 explored	 the	
shifting	dynamics	of	race	and	citizenship	in	the	context	of	the	War	on	Terror	through	focusing	
on	 different	 mechanisms	 of	 exclusion	 and	 expulsion.	 The	 research	 has	 involved	 semi-
structured	interviews	with	individuals	who	have	been	criminalised	in	this	context	and	subject	
to	some	measure	of	citizenship	deformation	in	the	process;	semi-structured	interviews	with	
human	 rights	 lawyers	 and	 third	 sector	 advocacy	 organisations;	 content	 analysis	 of	 legal	
judgements	 and	 policy	 reports;	 and	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 Home	 Office	 statistics	 on	
immigration	 and	 citizenship.	 	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 paper	 we	 draw	 upon	 citizenship	
statistics	data	published	by	the	Home	Office	which	are	supplemented	by	additional	data	we	
have	 acquired	 through	 Freedom	 of	 Information	 requests.	 Table	 cz-01	 which	 reports	
citizenship	 grants	 and	 refusals,	 Table	 cz-01qa	 which	 reports	 citizenship	 applications	 by	
country	of	nationality	and	Table	cz-09	which	reports	‘Refusals	of	citizenship	by	reason’	are	all	
used	 from	 the	 published	 Home	 Office	 Citizenship	 statistics.	 	 In	 conjunction	 data	 were	
provided	 on	 refusals	 of	 citizenship	 on	 grounds	 of	 ‘not	 good	 character’	 by	 country	 of	
nationality	for	each	year	between	2002	and	2011	(FOI	Request	26908	25	April	2013).	In	order	
to	 assess	 the	 prevalence	 and	 distribution	 of	 citizenship	 refusals	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 bad	
character,	we	were	 interested	 to	 calculate	what	 proportion	of	 total	 refusals	were	on	 the	
grounds	of	‘not	good	character’	by	country	of	national	origin.	Since	the	data	on	total	refusals	
by	nationality	are	not	published	routinely	by	the	Home	Office,	and	our	requests	for	access	to	
these	data	were	denied,	we	have	calculated	expected	refusals	for	each	country	of	nationality	
by	applying	the	overall	refusal	rate	for	each	year	to	the	number	of	applications	received	from	
each	country.	 	This	assumes	that	the	overall	 refusal	 rate	 is	evenly	distributed,	which	does	
pose	some	limits	on	the	findings	since	it	is	quite	possible	(and	the	evidence	suggests	likely)	
that	 applicants	 from	 some	 countries	 would	 have	 higher	 rates	 of	 refusal	 than	 others.	
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Nevertheless,	the	calculation	proceeds	on	a	reasonable	assumption	and	allows	us	to	consider	
the	distribution	of	refusals	in	a	robust	way.	We	have	excluded	countries	where	the	number	
of	people	refused	citizenship	on	character	grounds	is	less	than	5.	
	
The	 quantitative	 analysis	 is	 supplemented	 with	 analysis	 of	 legal	 judgements	 on	 appeals	
against	 naturalisation	 refusal.	We	analyse	 a	 selection	of	 judgements	 from	 the	High	Court	
(Administrative	 Court)	 deciding	 on	 appeals	 against	 refusals	 of	 naturalisation	 on	 character	
grounds	 but	 which	 do	 not	 constitute	 terrorism/national	 security	 reasons.	 	 These	 case	
judgements,	obtained	via	a	 search	 through	BAILII,	 include	appellants	 from	Sri	 Lanka,	 Iraq,	
Pakistan,	China	and	South	Africa	and	are	made	between	2012	and	2016.		In	addition,	all	open	
judgements	on	appeals	against	the	refusal	of	naturalised	citizenship,	decided	by	the	Special	
Immigration	Appeals	Commission	(SIAC)	between	2007	and	2017,	are	analysed	using	content	
analysis	 (15	 in	 total	 out	 of	 over	 100	 judgements	 in	 the	 period	 concerning	 deportation,	
citizenship	deprivation	and	refusal	of	entry	issues).		SIAC	was	established	in	1997	in	order	to	
deal	 with	 immigration	 cases	 where	 national	 security/terrorism	 concerns	 are	 raised,	 and	
accordingly	the	judgements	we	analyse	here	all	concern	cases	where	some	issue	relating	to	
national	security	has	been	given	as	part	of	the	reason	for	refusal.		The	cases	concerned	19	
individuals,	17	men	and	2	women.	The	country	of	origin	of	these	individuals	include	Algeria,	
Colombia,	 Iraq,	 Iran,	 Turkey	 (including	 two	 Kurdish	 people),	 Jordan/Palestine,	 Pakistan,	
Somalia	and	Syria.	Most	had	lived	in	the	UK	for	many	years	prior	to	applying	for	naturalisation.		
Most	of	the	individuals	waited	several	years	to	hear	back	about	their	naturalisation	decision	
and	then	some	more	years,	in	a	few	cases	a	whole	decade	before	their	appeal	was	heard.	To	
support	 these	data	we	draw	additionally	on	one	of	our	 interviews	with	Aaden,	 a	 refugee	
granted	indefinite	leave	to	remain	but	who	was	refused	naturalisation	on	character	grounds.	
Aaden	arrived	to	the	UK	from	Somalia	when	he	was	16	years	old	and	claimed	asylum.	He	did	
not	appeal	the	decision	in	SIAC	and	is	therefore	not	one	of	the	15	analysed	cases.		
	
	
Refusals	of	Naturalisation	
	
Since	the	early	2000s	there	has	been	a	general	 trend	of	steady	 increase	 in	the	number	of	
people	granted	British	 citizenship,	with	 some	 reduction	 in	 grant	 rates	 since	2013	 (Blinder	
2017).	Over	the	same	period,	between	2002	and	2016,	the	percentage	of	applications	refused	
citizenship	has	fluctuated	between	3%	and	10%,	averaging	6%	and	rising	again	to	10%	in	2016.		
The	relatively	low	proportion	of	overall	refusals	at	this	stage	is	in	part	explained	by	restrictions	
in	 place	 at	 earlier	 stages	 of	 the	 immigration	 process,	 which	 work	 to	 filter	 eligibility	 for	
application.		Yet	within	this	cohort	of	applications	refused,	since	the	mid	2000s	the	number	
of	people	being	refused	naturalised	citizenship	on	the	grounds	of	‘bad	character’	has	been	
gradually	increasing	so	that,	after	a	small	dip	in	2014,	in	2015	43%,	and	in	2016	44%,	of	people	
who	were	refused	British	citizenship	were	denied	on	this	basis	(see	Figure	1).	Bad	character	
is	consequently	becoming	the	principle	reason	why	citizenship	is	denied	in	Britain.		
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Insert	Figure	1	Here	
	
Within	 this	 trend,	 the	 data	 indicates	 that	 refusals	 on	 character	 grounds	 are	 unevenly	
distributed	and	some	nationalities	are	more	likely	to	be	refused	for	such	reasons	compared	
with	others.		The	data	we	analysed	shows	this	uneven	distribution	to	be	the	case	since	2002	
but	we	 focus	on	data	 from	2006	here,	 two	years	before	 a	 significant	 jump	 in	 refusals	 on	
character	grounds	in	2008,	and	three	years	before	the	official	policy	shift	in	2009.	Since	we	
calculate	percentage	refusals	on	character	grounds	as	proportions	of	expected	rates	of	total	
refusal	for	each	country,	some	of	the	results	show	that	more	than	100%	of	applications	from	
particular	nationalities	are	refused	on	character	grounds.	While	 this	confirms	that	specific	
percentage	rates	we	show	are	to	be	treated	with	some	caution,	the	results	do	indicate	that	
the	overall	refusals	for	applicants	from	these	countries	are	higher	than	would	be	expected	
(our	denominator	estimates	are	too	low)	and	also	suggest	that	a	high	proportion	of	refusals	
from	these	countries	are	for	reasons	of	‘not	good	character’.			Applicants	who	are	nationals	
of	Turkey,	Vietnam,	Kosovo,	Angola,	Jamaica,	Rwanda,	Congo,	Tunisia,	Algeria,	Sudan,	Sierra	
Leone,	 Iran,	 Palestine	 and	 Libya	 are	 consistently	more	 likely	 to	 be	 refused	 citizenship	 on	
character	grounds	compared	with	the	average	rate.	From	2008	there	was	a	significant	rise	in	
refusing	applicants	 from	 Iraq	and	Afghanistan	and	 rejected	applications	 from	nationals	of	
these	countries	remain	high	over	the	subsequent	period.			
	
Insert	Figure	2	Here	
	
It	 is	difficult	 from	these	data	to	confirm	why	nationals	of	 the	 listed	countries	 in	particular	
feature	amongst	those	most	likely	to	be	refused	on	character	grounds,	but	they	do	represent	
states	from	where	a	high	proportion	of	asylum	applications	have	come	from	five	years	or	so	
preceding	citizenship	application,	and	countries	facing	civil	or	imperialist	wars	in	which	Britain	
has	had	a	direct	or	indirect	role	and	post/colonial	relationship.		One	of	the	justifications	for	
refusing	 citizenship	 on	 character	 grounds,	 as	 noted	 above,	 refers	 to	 ‘deception	 and	
dishonesty’	 in	 any	 liaison	with	 a	 state	 department,	 a	 sufficiently	 broad	 criterion	 that	 can	
encompass	 a	 range	of	 actions	and	behaviours.	 The	 caseworker	 guidance	notes	 indicate	 it	
refers	to	attempts	to	enter	the	country	using	false	or	misleading	documents	and/or	attempts	
to	gain	access	to	public	and	social	services	which	one’s	immigration	status	prohibits	against	
(Home	Office	2013).	Since	the	onslaught	of	legislative	restrictions	against	asylum	make	it	near	
impossible	 to	 arrive	 as	 an	 asylum	 seeker	 ‘legally’,	 without	 incurring	 some	 kind	 of	 legal	
infraction	(Schuster	2011),	and	the	exclusion	from	or	limited	access	to	basic	services	such	as	
healthcare	 and	 housing	 mean	 transgression	 becomes	 a	 necessity	 for	 most	 to	 survive	
(Schuster	2011),	it	is	quite	possible	that	the	measure	of	‘deception	and	dishonesty’	offers	a	
way	to	exclude	from	British	citizenship	large	numbers	of	individuals	who	have	arrived	via	the	
asylum	 route.	 Though	 denial	 of	 citizenship	 by	 naturalisation	 does	 not	mean	 the	 right	 of	
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residency	 is	 retracted	 it	 does	 maintain	 a	 position	 of	 precariousness	 for	 those	 refused,	
restricting	 freedom	 of	 movement	 for	 those	 with	 no	 viable	 passport	 and	 preserving	 a	
sustained	possibility	for	deportation	at	future	dates.	
	
From	‘Deception	and	Dishonesty’	to	‘Crimes	against	Humanity’	
	
The	 alluded	 connection	 between	 refusal	 of	 naturalisation	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 ‘not	 good	
character’	 and	 arrival	 to	 Britain	 via	 the	 asylum	 route	 is	 supported	 in	 the	 data	 from	 legal	
judgements,	which	shed	more	detailed	light	on	the	way	in	which	character	has	come	to	be	
institutionally	expressed	and	articulated.	 	 In	 the	majority	of	 the	 judgements	we	examined	
decided	by	the	High	Court	and	by	SIAC,	the	individuals	who	were	contesting	the	refusal	of	
their	citizenship	had	arrived	in	Britain	as	asylum	seekers.			
	
Within	these	cases	decisions	to	refuse	citizenship	on	the	basis	of	the	applicant	being	‘not	of	
good	 character’	 largely	 fell	 into	 one	 of	 two	 broad	 categories.	 The	 first	 encompass	
contraventions	 of	 administrative	 regulations	 which	 set	 the	 parameters	 for	 recognition,	
acceptance	and	desirability.	Such	reasons	might	include	issues	with	or	inconsistencies	in	the	
completion	of	immigration	paperwork,	fines	or	minor	misdemeanours	such	as	convictions	for	
speeding.		The	second,	and	that	more	frequently	invoked,	incorporate	histories	of	political	
associations	or	affiliations	with	state	or	non-state	actors	identified	as	either	being	terrorist	
organisations,	 ‘war	 criminals’	 or	 engaged	 in	 ‘crimes	 against	 humanity’.	 	 Both,	 in	 different	
ways,	work	to	sustain	and	enhance	structured	racialized	systems	of	exclusion,	marginalisation	
and	precariousness	as	they	operate	through	immigration	and	border	control.	
	
In	 the	 first	set	of	cases,	denial	of	citizenship	on	grounds	of	administrative	 irregularity	and	
minor	 criminalised	 infractions	 operates	 as	 part	 of	 the	 sustained	 criminalisation	 of	
immigration	which	has	involved	the	merging	of	the	two	sets	of	judicial	systems	(criminal	and	
administrative)	and	legal	apparatus	(criminal	and	immigration	law).	In	a	number	of	the	cases	
we	 analysed,	 the	 reason	 for	 refusal	 of	 citizenship	 was	 premised	 on	 discrepancies	 in	
administrative	documentation.	Xue	Zhen	Cao	arrived	in	the	UK	seeking	asylum	from	China	in	
2003,	 granted	 refuge	 and	 eventual	 indefinite	 leave	 to	 remain	 in	 2010	 (Xue	 Zhen	 Cao	 v	
Secretary	of	State	2015).		A	two	year	discrepancy	in	her	date	of	birth	as	it	was	recorded	on	
two	separate	documents	–	her	birth	certificate	from	China	had	stated	her	date	of	birth	as	3rd	
December	 1985	 and	 her	 solicitors	 had	 recorded	her	 date	 of	 birth	 on	 her	 indefinite	 leave	
application	as	3rd	December	1983	–	led	to	a	refusal	to	transfer	her	indefinite	leave	to	remain	
stamp	onto	her	newly	acquired	passport	from	China	when	it	was	eventually	acquired	in	2010	
(in	 her	 appeal	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 her	 poor	 English	 had	 inhibited	 her	 from	 checking	 the	
application	made	by	solicitors).	Her	subsequent	attempt	 to	apply	 for	citizenship	was	 then	
refused	on	these	same	grounds,	where	the	Home	Secretary	stated	this	to	be	‘a	deliberate	
attempt	to	mislead	government’	and	was	‘not	satisfied’	that	the	good	character	requirement	
had	been	met	(Xue	Zhen	Cao	v	Secretary	of	State	2015).	
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In	 the	 case	 of	 Poloko	Hiri,	 a	 Botswanan	 national	who	 served	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	 British	
military	as	a	citizen	of	 the	British	commonwealth,	he	was	denied	citizenship	because	of	a	
speeding	infraction	which	resulted	in	a	fine	and	points	on	his	licence	(Poloko	Hiri	v	Secretary	
of	 State	 2014).	 In	 December	 2011	 he	 learned	 that	 the	 Government	 of	 Botswana	 was	
"rigorously	enforcing"	the	Foreign	Enlistment	Act	1980,	which	made	it	a	criminal	offence	to	
act	in	the	military	service	of	another	country,	without	the	permission	of	the	President	and	
that	he	would	be	at	risk	of	prosecution	and	lengthy	imprisonment	if	he	returned	to	Botswana.	
Shortly	 after	 he	 applied	 for	 naturalized	 British	 citizenship	 and	 was	 refused	 on	 character	
grounds,	on	account	of	his	speeding	infraction.		As	the	tenets	of	crimmigration	are	extended	
into	 the	 framework	 of	 citizenship	 (Aas	 2011),	 the	 obstacles	which	 inhibit	 the	 granting	 of	
secure	residency	status	are	given	greater	permanency,	working	to	restrict	access	to	rights	and	
entitlements	for	denizens.			
	
At	the	same	time	the	multiple	assumptions	in	operation	which	underpin	the	process,	policy	
stipulations	and	decision	justifications	for	those	denied	citizenship	on	‘not	good	character’	
grounds	in	relation	to	political	affiliations	or	associations	of	applicants	further	a	different,	but	
equally	significant,	set	of	racialized	positions,	assumptions	and	rationalisations.		The	policy	
guidance	 for	 denying	 naturalisation	 for	 reasons	 of	 bad	 character	 specifies	 as	 one	 set	 of	
grounds	for	refusal	‘involvement’	or	‘association’	with	‘war	crimes,	crimes	against	humanity	
or	genocide’.		Analysis	of	the	actions	or	behaviours	of	the	individual	cases	where	applicants	
have	been	 labelled	 in	 these	 terms	 reveals	 a	more	 complex	 story	 that	 illustrates	 both	 the	
positing	of	a	unilateral	framing	of	global	political	violence	that	elevates	the	‘West’	above	‘the	
rest’	and	the	impossibility	of	being	able	to	redeem	one’s	character	when	read	in	this	racialized	
context.		
	
Dariush	Amirifard’s	story	is	 illuminating	here.	 	Conscripted	to	perform	compulsory	military	
service	in	Iran	in	1998,	Amirifard	was	assigned	to	work	as	a	prison	guard	where	his	duties	
involved	escorting	prisoners	to	their	execution	and	where	he	was	a	regular	witness	to	torture	
(Dariush	Amirifard	v	Secretary	of	State,	2013).	His	mental	health	declined	as	a	result	and	after	
a	 year,	 suffering	 from	 depression	 he	 absconded.	 	When	 he	was	 subsequently	 found	 and	
arrested,	he	was	sentenced	to	military	detention	for	one	month,	and	ordered	to	undertake	
an	additional	four	months	of	conscription.	He	served	half	of	his	military	detention	before	he	
was	given	an	amnesty.	
	
After	21	months	of	military	service,	he	was	guarding	a	section	of	the	prison	which	contained	
mainly	university	students	detained	without	trial.	When	he	refused	an	order	to	shoot	at	them,	
he	was	threatened	by	the	prison	chief,	and	beaten	with	a	rifle	(Dariush	Amirifard	v	Secretary	
of	State,	2013,	s.6.6).	He	managed	to	escape	and	eventually	made	his	way	to	the	UK.	The	
reason	provided	by	the	Home	Office	for	the	refusal	of	his	citizenship	stated	that	he	had	‘spent	
a	significant	period	of	time	working	for	the	Iranian	Jail	Organisation	and	it	is	considered	that	
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[he]	were	a	valued	and	committed	supporter	of	the	regime’	(Dariush	Amirifard	v	Secretary	of	
State,	2013,	s.13).		When	his	lawyers	asked	for	a	review	of	the	decision	they	were	informed	
that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 had	 ‘serious	 doubts’	 about	 Dariush’s	 character	 ‘due	 to	 his	
association	with	crimes	against	humanity’	(Dariush	Amirifard	v	Secretary	of	State,	2013,	s.19).	
	
Though	 the	 Home	 Secretary	 did	 not	 dispute	 the	 Claimant's	 contention	 that	 he	 ‘did	 not	
actively	participate	in	human	rights	abuses’,	she	did	conclude	that	he	was	‘involved	in	and	
associated	with’	such	abuses	having	been	"directly	responsible	for	taking	prisoners	to	their	
execution",	 and	 being	 ‘witness’	 to	 the	 torture	 of	 political	 detainees	 (Dariush	 Amirifard	 v	
Secretary	of	State,	2013,	s.20).	
	
While	such	a	rationalisation	illuminates	the	constricted	nature	of	the	lens	through	which	stark	
contingencies	and	extenuating	circumstances	are	evaluated	and	recognised,	there	is	also	an	
additional	point	concerning	temporality	at	play	in	the	decision-making	process	that	bases	and	
refuses	citizenship	on	past	activities.	Not	only	in	Amirifrad’s	case,	but	in	others	too,	the	past	
is	 reviewed	 to	 sometimes	 reveal	 a	 fatal	 transgression	 by	 the	 reckoning	 of	 the	 British	
authorities,	but	this	transgression	remains	permanent	in	form.		In	this	sense	the	rendering	of	
citizenship,	when	bestowed	upon	the	racially	othered	figure,	only	recognises	purity,	and	this	
purity	is	not	a	current	condition	(what	you	are	doing	now)	but	is	also	read	into	the	past.			The	
reading	and	institutionalization	of	character	in	this	way	not	only	opens	up	a	wide	space	for	
enabling	 citizenship	 refusal	 –	 in	 many	 cases	 where	 citizenship	 applications	 are	 made	 by	
individuals	who	 arrive	 in	 the	UK	 via	 the	 asylum	 route	 there	 is	 always	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	
background	 issue	 relating	 to	 some	political	 violence	 that	would	not	by	 such	 standards	be	
considered	‘pure’	in	form	–	it	cements	an	impossible	threshold	for	non-white	denizens,	and	
so	augments	a	racialized	construction	of	citizenship.	
	
Such	racially	charged	dimensions,	manifested	in	terms	of	group	association,	are	evident	too	
in	cases	where	citizenship	refusal	on	the	grounds	of	being	‘not	of	good	character’	has	been	
justified	in	terms	of	being	in	the	interests	of	national	security.		
	
	
Refusing	Citizenship	on	National	Security	Grounds	
	
SIAC	decisions	are	made	by	three	state-selected	judges	and	no	jury.		The	court	hears	evidence	
in	 a	 mixture	 of	 open	 and	 closed	 sessions	 and	 decisions	 can	 largely	 be	 set	 out	 in	 closed	
judgements	but	the	accompanying	open	judgements	are	published	on	the	SIAC	website.	In	
the	closed	sessions	appellants	and	their	lawyers	are	not	allowed	to	see	the	evidence	against	
them	but	instead	they	are	assigned	a	(security	cleared)	special	advocate	to	represent	them,	
and	with	whom	they	are	not	permitted	to	communicate	once	the	advocate	has	been	privy	to	
the	evidence	against	them	(Kapoor	2018).		There	had	been	few	deportation	cases	dealt	with	
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by	SIAC	before	September	2001	but	the	number	of	cases	escalated	significantly	post	9/11	
(Kapoor	2018).		
	
Analysis	of	 these	 judgements	 also	 indicate	 the	extensive	 reach	of	 ‘character’	 for	deciding	
applications	 on	 citizenship.	 Sometimes	 a	 mark	 against	 character	 related	 to	 a	 direct	
association	with	a	political	organisation	identified	as	‘extreme’,	irrespective	of	whether	this	
was	past	or	present.	This	included	being	politically	involved	in	a	wide	range	of	groups	with	
different	 ideologies	 including	 political	 parties,	 resistance	 groups	 or	 anti-regime	 political	
factions.	Individuals	denied	under	the	criteria	of	bad	character	include	cases	of	people	who	
were	politically	active	in,	or	in	other	ways	associated	with,	such	diverse	movements	as	the	
Iraqi	National	Congress	(INC),	the	Somalian	Al-Shabaab,	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	
Colombia	(FARC),	The	Kurdistan	Workers'	Party	(PKK)	and	the	Groupe	Islamique	Armé	(GIA).	
The	direct	association	also	included	those	who	were	not	necessarily	part	of	any	movement	
but	for	example	engaged	in	preaching	‘anti-Western	views’	(FM	v	Secretary	of	State	2015)	
and	making	public	statements	that	were	‘of	an	Islamist	extremist	nature’	(AHK	and	Others	v	
Secretary	of	State	2013).		
	
The	extensive	reach	of	 ‘not	good	character’	here	 included	‘extremist	views’	that	were	not	
spoken,	but	implied.	One	SIAC	judgement	stated	that	it	considered	extremist	views	‘whether	
those	 views	 are	 overt	 or	 covert’	 (MSB	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 2016,	 s.59),	 implying	 that	 the	
thoughts	 of	 an	 individual,	 where,	 as	 the	 Home	 Office	 noted,	 ‘the	 applicant	 harboured	
extremist	 views	 and	 in	 that	 silent	 sense,	 supported	 the	 extremist	 organisation’	 (MSB	 v	
Secretary	 of	 State	 2016,	 p.14)	were	 also	 to	 be	 considered,	 exemplifying	 a	 version	 of	 the	
dogma-line	racism	in	practice	that	Medovoi	(2012)	alludes	to.			
	
However,	 the	 second,	 and	 more	 prominent,	 reason	 for	 ‘not	 good	 character’	 citizenship	
refusals	in	national	security	related	cases	concerns	indirect	associations.	This	proceeds	on	the	
basis	of	guilt	by	association	and	affects	those	identified	as	being	connected	to	others	who	are	
considered	of	 ‘bad	character’,	here	known	to	security	services	and/or	 linked	to	terrorism-
related	 activity.	 Resonating	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 collective	 criminalisation,	 such	 as	 Joint	
Enterprise	laws	(Williams	and	Clarke	2016)	which	operate	on	the	basis	of	guilt	by	association,	
this	 set	 of	 reasonings,	whether	 in	 the	 past	 or	 the	 present,	 come	 to	 form	 the	majority	 of	
naturalisation	refusal	cases	dealt	with	by	SIAC.		
	
When	 a	 person	 seeking	 naturalisation	 completes	 the	 application	 form	 they	 are	 asked	 to	
answer	 three	 questions	 regarding	 involvement	 in	 criminal,	 terrorist	 or	 extremist	 activity,	
referring	 to	 their	 active	 association.	 The	 third	 question:	 “Have	 you	 engaged	 in	 any	 other	
activities	which	might	indicate,	that	you	may	not	be	considered	a	person	of	good	character?”	
is	considered	to	be	a	‘catch-all’	question	(MNY	v	Secretary	of	State	2016).	In	the	case	of	AQH,	
the	Home	Office	clarified	this	last	question	‘was	not	merely	focused	on	whether	the	applicant	
had	engaged	in	terrorist	or	extremist	activity,	but	was	wide	enough	to	encompass	association	
	 14	
with	terrorists	or	extremists’	(AFA	v	Secretary	of	State	2016,	s.46).	The	implication	of	such	a	
rationale	 is	 to	 effectively	 expand	 the	 scope	 of	 who	 can	 be	 criminalised	 and	 so	 refused	
citizenship	on	such	character	grounds.	In	the	case,	ARM	v	Secretary	of	State,	the	appellant	
was	 deemed	 of	 bad	 character	 because	 of	 his	 association	with	 Abu	Qatada.	 The	 link	was	
partially	 made	 using	 a	 newspaper	 article	 that	 pointed	 to	 the	 connection.	 Despite	 the	
magazine	 later	 withdrawing	 this	 statement	 and	 issuing	 a	 correction,	 the	 article	 was	
nevertheless	used	as	evidence	(ARM	v	Secretary	of	State	2016,	p.9).	
	
In	the	same	case,	in	2016,	following	challenges	to	the	secrecy	around	the	decision-making	
process,	 the	 Home	 Office	 disclosed	 guidance	 issued	 to	 caseworkers	 for	 considering	
applications	where	an	individual	is	thought	to	have	association	with	individuals	or	groups	that	
are	 considered	 ‘extremist’	 (ARM	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 2016).	 	 According	 to	 a	 witness	
statement,	there	is	'Closed	Home	Office	guidance	entitled	Chapter	6	Terrorism'	that	has,	since	
September	2009,	guided	case	workers	on	how	to	assess	 ‘association	by	an	appellant	with	
extremists.’	(ARM	v	Secretary	of	State,	p.30).	The	guidance	instructs	that	in	a	case	when	a	
person	 has	 associations	 with	 ‘such	 individuals’	 yet	 is	 unaware	 of	 their	 background	 or	
activities,	they	must	‘cease	that	association’	once	they	find	out	about	it.		
	
One	 of	 our	 interviewees,	 Aaden,	 was	 refused	 citizenship	 on	 these	 grounds,	 due	 to	 his	
association	with	others	who	were	 identified	 to	be	extremist.	Aaden	had	begun	attending	
different	talks	at	diffident	mosques	in	his	local	area,	as	part	of	his	own	reengagement	with	
his	faith	and	joined	a	local	football	team	linked	to	one	of	the	mosques.	It	was	his	association	
with	others	through	the	football	team	that	led	to	his	naturalization	refusal.	He	was	only	made	
aware	 that	 his	 associates	 were	 regarded	 as	 being	 suspicious	 once	 he	 had	 been	 refused	
naturalisation.		
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 one	 of	 the	 female	 applicants	 (MNY	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 2016),	 her	 main	
association	to	an	Islamic	extremist	was	through	her	friend,	who	was	the	girlfriend	of	someone	
who	 had	 engaged	 in	 terrorism-related	 activity.	 Other	 cases	 involving	 women	 who	 we	
interviewed	as	part	of	the	project	reveal	the	gendered	nature	of	the	process	where	women	
are	made	 guilty	 by	 association	 through	 family	 and	marriage.	 In	 such	 cases	 the	 guidance	
instructing	 case	 workers	 which	 states	 the	 applicant	 should	 indicate	 they	 ‘ceased	 such	
association	as	soon	as	they	became	aware	of	the	background	of	these	individuals’	(ARM	v	
Secretary	of	State	2016	p.32)	is	near	impossible	to	achieve	when	associations	are	based	on	
family	connections.			
	
The	issue	of	temporality	that	plays	out	in	the	broader	immigration	cases	is	consistent	in	the	
way	it	manifests	itself	in	national	security	cases.	In	cases	where	association	had	ceased	some	
time	ago	such	as	in	the	cases	of	HN’s	past	political	activism	in	Colombia	(HN	v	Secretary	of	
State	2015),	SA’s	past	association	with	the	PKK	(SA	v	Secretary	of	State	2016)	or	AQH’s	past	
expressed	support	of	Islamic	Courts	in	Somalia	(AQH	v	Secretary	of	State	2016),	the	Home	
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Office	nevertheless	based	their	decision	on	‘the	activities	both	past	and	present’	as	is	often	
the	 standard	 phrase	 used	 in	 letters	 of	 citizenship	 refusal	 sent	 to	 individuals	 (see	MNY	 v	
Secretary	of	State	2016).		
	
The	Home	Office	guidance	goes	on	 to	suggest	caseworkers	 look	 for	 ‘suggestions’	 that	 the	
applicant	 may	 have	 signalled	 ‘their	 implicit	 approval	 of	 the	 views	 and	 nature	 of	 these	
individuals’	extremist	activities/background’.	Here	another	point	connected	to	the	issue	of	
temporality	is	at	play	since	the	caseworker	is	urged	to	review	how	long	the	association	with	
an	‘extremist’	person	may	have	lasted,	noting	the	‘longer	the	association,	the	more	likely	that	
the	applicant	is	aware	of/approves	of	the	activities	and	views’	(ARM	v	Secretary	of	State	2016,	
p.31).	In	the	cases	of	women	married	to	men	deemed	to	be	‘extremist’,	an	implicit	approval	
might	simply	be	the	 fact	of	 their	marriage.	The	 longer	 the	couple	have	been	married,	 the	
more	she	is	assumed	to	approve	of	her	partner’s	activities.	
	
While	past	transgressions	and	present/past	associations	are	cemented	in	the	decision-making	
process	around	character	the	point	that	Medovoi	(2012)	makes	about	having	to	continuously	
prove	 one’s	 ‘conversion’	 is	materialised	 in	 the	 state	 demands	 around	 surveillance,	which	
requires	that	suspect	communities	(Hillyard	1993)	continuously	prove	their	‘good	character’.	
The	guidance	to	caseworkers	suggests	that	where	there	are	concerns	related	to	terrorism,	
those	seeking	to	become	British	citizens	should	also	demonstrate	a	willingness	to	engage	in	
everyday	policing	of	the	people	around	them.	The	guidance	states	that	a	person	might	be	
able	to	satisfy	the	good	character	requirement	if	they	‘presented	strong	evidence	of	choosing	
such	associates	with	the	aim	of	trying	to	moderate	their	views	and/or	influence	over	others’	
(ARM	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 p.8).	 By	 the	 same	 logic	 applications	 should	 be	 refused	 if	 the	
applicant	associated	with	individuals	who	had	‘extremist	views’	but	did	not	show	evidence	of	
a	willingness	to	engage	in	moderating	their	views.		
	
The	emphasis	on	community	self-policing	is	further	expressed	and	elaborated	upon	through	
SIAC	judgements	in	relation	to	appellant	interactions	with	MI5.	In	a	number	of	the	SIAC	cases	
individuals	who	were	refused	talked	of	several	ways	in	which	the	MI5	were	implicated	in	their	
naturalisation	refusals.	AQH	said	in	a	witness	statement	that	‘he	does	not	know	why	he	did	
not	satisfy	the	requirement	of	good	character	but	believed	that	it	was	linked	to	his	refusal	of	
working	 for	 the	 MI5’	 (AQH	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 2016).	 Another	 (MSB)	 argued	 that	 the	
evidence	relating	to	his	character	were	obtained	by	the	Home	Office	through	informants	in	
the	community.	Aaden	too	was	informed	by	security	services	that	British	citizenship	would	
be	made	available	if	he	agreed	to	work	for	them.		
	
Conclusion	
Managing	citizenship	through	an	assessment	of	‘character’	functions	as	a	way	of	sustaining	
the	racialized	dynamics	of	the	nation-state,	creating	a	durability	to	the	precarious	status	of	
‘non-citizens’	whilst	also	enhancing	the	armory	of	disciplinary	practices	available	to	the	state	
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for	potential	use	against	 ‘failed	citizens’.	The	character	 threshold	constitutes	a	new	set	of	
restrictions	and	constraints	upon	the	life	and	opportunities	of	the	non-white	denizen.		
	
Where	Britain’s	colonial	and	imperial	history	has	been	critical	for	shaping	access	to	citizenship	
as	a	privileged	legal	status,	 it	 is	contemporary	race	and	imperialist	politics,	materialised	in	
terms	of	immigration	and	counter-terrorism	policing,	that	shape	the	borders,	boundaries	and	
qualifications	 to	 citizenship	 in	 the	 present.	 	While	 discourses	 of	 nativism	 and	 indigeneity	
remain	 an	 underlying	 thread	 that	 inform	 nationalist	 ideas	 of	 belonging	 and	 are	
institutionalised	through	immigration	policy	and	whose	citizenship	is	always	in	question,	the	
supplementary	 logic	 of	 character	 and	 associated	 notion	 of	 criminality	 are	 becoming	
increasingly	critical	to	materialising	racialized	exclusions,	creating	additional	thresholds	to	bar	
against	non-white	denizens.		
	
Though	 there	 are	 specific	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 assessment	 of	 character	 is	 invoked	 against	
different	cohorts	of	immigrants	and	asylum	seekers,	the	flexibility	and	expansive	nature	of	
criminalisation	attached	to	the	concept	paves	the	way	 for	an	enduring	shift	 in	hegemonic	
political	 narratives	 of	 what	 citizenship	 is	 or	 ought	 to	 be.	 Since	 the	 sin	 that	 is	 harboured	
(Medovoi	 2012)	 within	 these	 transgressive	 subjects	 can	 be	 related	 to	 ‘deception	 or	
dishonesty’	in	the	immigration	process,	the	political	violence	of	the	context	from	which	they	
have	 sought	 refuge	 in	 Britain,	 or	 indirect	 associations	with	 others	 deemed	 to	 be	 of	 ‘bad	
character’,	 the	 stipulations	 for	 redemption	 emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 continually	 prove	
moderation	of	oneself	as	well	as	the	views	or	behaviours	of	others.	Citizenship	is	much	more	
more	starkly	presented	not	as	an	unconditional	entity,	but	a	privilege	continuously	open	to	
reassessment.		The	mobilisation	of	character	readings	in	these	ways	not	only	opens	up	a	wide	
space	for	enabling	citizenship	refusal,	it	also	cements	an	impossible	threshold	for	non-white	
denizens,	and	so	augments	a	racialized	construction	of	citizenship.		
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Source:	 Home	 Office	 Citizenship	 Table	 cz-01qa-Citizenship	 Applications	 by	 Country	 of	
Nationality	2016;	Home	Office	FOI	Response	26908,	25	April	2013.	
	
